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Showing posts from February, 2013

DGCA/NEW-MISC/152

AD No.: 2013-0020R1 Date: 26 February 2013 ATA 25 : Equipment & Furnishings – Safety Belts / Torso Restraint Systems – Inspection /                 Replacement Manufacturers  : AmSafe; Anjou Aeronautique (formerly TRW Repa S.A., formerly L'Aiglon);                            Davis  Aircraft Products Co.; Schroth Safety Products GmbH; Pacific Scientific. Applicability : All part numbers of safety belts and torso restraint systems installed on any aircraft where dynamically tested seats are required in accordance with airworthiness requirements like the European Certification Specifications (CS), or JAR/FAR, paragraphs 23.562, 25.562, 27.562 and 29.562, if safety belts and torso restraint systems have been maintained or repaired after 28 September 2003 by maintenance organizations not holding the applicable maintenance data of the relevant approval holders, unless they are marked with European Parts Approval (EPA). Required Action(s) and Compliance Time(s): Required as

ICA - Airworthiness Limitations Section

H25.4Airworthiness Limitations section. (a) The Instructions for Continued Airworthiness must contain a section titled Airworthiness Limitations that is segregated and clearly distinguishable from the rest of the document. This section must set forth— (1) Each mandatory modification time, replacement time, structural inspection interval, and related structural inspection procedure approved under § 25.571. (2) Each mandatory replacement time, inspection interval, related inspection procedure, and all critical design configuration control limitations approved under § 25.981 for the fuel tank system. (3) Any mandatory replacement time of EWIS components as defined in section 25.1701. (4) A limit of validity of the engineering data that supports the structural maintenance program (LOV), stated as a total number of accumulated flight cycles or flight hours or both, approved under § 25.571. Until the full-scale fatigue testing is completed and the FAA has approved the LOV, the number

Airworthiness release

§ 121.709 Airworthiness release or aircraft log entry. (a) No certificate holder may operate an aircraft after maintenance, preventive maintenance or alterations are performed on the aircraft unless the certificate holder, or the person with whom the certificate holder arranges for the performance of the maintenance, preventive maintenance, or alterations, prepares or causes to be prepared— (1) An airworthiness release; or (2) An appropriate entry in the aircraft log. (b) The airworthiness release or log entry required by paragraph (a) of this section must— (1) Be prepared in accordance with the procedures set forth in the certificate holder's manual; (2) Include a certification that— (i) The work was performed in accordance with the requirements of the certificate holder's manual; (ii) All items required to be inspected were inspected by an authorized person who determined that the work was satisfactorily completed; (iii) No known condition exists that would make t

Maintenance instructions

 Maintenance instructions.  Scheduling information for each part of the airplane and its engines, auxiliary power units, propellers, accessories, instruments, and equipment that provides the recommended periods at which they should be cleaned, inspected, adjusted, tested, and lubricated, and the degree of inspection, the applicable wear tolerances, and work recommended at these periods.                           However, the applicant may refer to an accessory, instrument, or equipment manufacturer as the source of this information if the applicant shows that the item has an exceptionally high degree of complexity requiring specialized maintenance techniques, test equipment, or expertise.                          The recommended overhaul periods and necessary cross references to the Airworthiness Limitations section of the manual must also be included. In addition, the applicant must include an inspection program that includes the frequency and extent of the inspections necessary to

FAA AD 2012-24-09 HET Turbochargers FAA AD

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          The FAA has issued  AD2012-24-09 on HET model TAO411 turbo chargers overhauled or repaired since August 29, 2012, using a turbine wheel, P/N 410188- 0019, serial number H120716 through H121988.       Affected turbochargers are to be replaced before further flight.           The AD does provide for special flight permits provided that the flight is limited to three hours, the turbocharger boost is set to “Off” in the cockpit if applicable and the wastegate for the turbocharger is safety wired in the open position.                 This AD affects the Cessna Model T182T. Cessna has determined that no aircraft have been factory delivered and that no spares engines or spares turbochargers have been sold by Cessna Service Parts and Programs that are affected. Cessna Single Engine Service Letter SEL-81-02 Revision 1: Transmittal of HET Alert Service Bulletin No.048 and Lycoming Mandatory Service Bulletin No. 604 have been issued to convey this message. DGCA/NEW MISC/150

Supplemental Inspection Documents

        The Supplemental Inspection Documents or SID’s have been released for the 200 and 100 Series piston engine aircraft and the 1996 and on Single Engine Piston Aircraft. All SID’s Inspections are now incorporated into the affected Maintenance Manuals via revision with the exception of the early 120, 140, 170 and 195 models which have been released as stand-alone inspections. Answers to some frequently asked questions are presented here. The SID’s and CAP Relationship SEL-05-01 Revision 1 was developed to announce that some of the existing Continued Airworthiness Program (CAP) inspections have been superseded by the SID program. The CAP inspections were superseded by the SID’s to enable modern inspection methods, move to task based inspection techniques and add additional inspection necessitated by the service history and analysis of the structural capabilities present in various models. Because the CAP was not eliminated, the CAP inspections that were not superseded by SI

Instructions For Continued Airworthiness (ICA’S)

          Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA’s) have become a common term in aviation maintenance. ICA’s encompass Service Publications, Maintenance Manuals, Vendor Manuals referenced in the airplane maintenance manual, maintenance and inspection instructions provided by supplemental type certificate holders as well as the Cessna publications specifically titled “ICA” followed by the model number of the airplane for which they are applicable. It is the latter that many are not familiar with. These documents are a supplement to the airplane maintenance manual and provide the latest information when inspecting, troubleshooting or performing maintenance on the airplanes to which they are applicable. Cessna has published various ICA’s for all of the current production models of aircraft. The data in these ICA’s covers information on maintaining and inspecting equipment or systems incorporated in production that have not been incorporated in the maintenance manual. It should

Founder's Memorial Day

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Founder's Memorial Day observed by Orient Flights staff and students of Orient Flight School Pondicherry on 14th February, 2013 Please leave comments and share.

Engine Controls: Continental Throttle and Mixture

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   FAA issued SAIB: NE-13-15  Dated : February 8, 2013 on  Engine Controls : Throttle and Mixture Control Levers   used on Continental.                           This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) is  an airworthiness  concern related to certain throttle and mixture control levers. Affected engines include all IO-240,  IO-360, LTSIO-360, TSIO-360, IO-346, IO-470, GIO-470, TSIO-470, IO-520, GTSIO-520,  LIO-520, TSIO-520, IO-550, GIO-550, TSIO-550, and TSIOL-550 continuous flow, fuel  injected engines (except FADEC-equipped engines).                 The FAA has received reports from the field of throttle and mixture control levers loosening during  service, resulting in either a partial or complete loss of throttle and/ or mixture control. The subject  throttle and mixture control levers were manufactured from a bronze material.                Splines on the mating control shaft are pressed into the bronze control levers during installation by  torquing a l

AIRCRAFT WASHING AND RINSING

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                On 27 November 2008, an Airbus A320-200 crashed into the sea off the coast of Perpignan  during an airworthiness check flight and was destroyed, killing all 7 occupants.                      According to the investigation’s report, the accident was caused by the loss of control of the  aeroplane by the crew following the improvised demonstration of the functioning of the Angle  Of Attack (AOA) protections, which were inoperable at the time because the AOA sensors had  jammed making it impossible for the protections to trigger.               The jamming of the AOA sensors had been caused by freezing of the water which was  present as a result of incorrect rinsing procedures being used on the aircraft three days before  the accident flight.            The purpose of this Information Notice is to remind maintenance organisations and other  organisations which are responsible for washing and rinsing operations on aircraft to adhere  to approved maintenance proced

FAA AD 2013-02-13 Inspections of Older Piper Aircraft

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                 FAA requiring inspections on tens of thousands of older model Piper airplanes to check cables that control tail surfaces.                             FAA is posted a directive FAA AD 2013-02-13   prompted by reports of failures in the cable assembly which direct a plane's nose. The rule requires inspections and parts replacement as needed, to correct what the FAA calls an "unsafe condition." The requirement applies to certain Piper aircraft that are more than 15 years old. Effective Date :  March 11, 2013.          Initially inspection is require of the stabilator control system following instructions 1 through 10 of Piper  Aircraft, Inc. Mandatory Service Bulletin No. 1245A, dated November 28, 2012                         It will mandate enhanced inspections and repairs where necessary  to cables that control tail surfaces on about 30,000 Piper aircraft, some of the  most popular general-aviation planes sold in the U.S.          Prompted by at

Piers Facility seaplane operation

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  PIERS . Piers are recommended where the variation in water level is 16 inches (45 cm) or less. Location. A minimum of 100 feet (30 m) of unobstructed water or a turning basin should be available in the direction from which approaches are normally made to the pier. Piers should be located so that access to them by the public will not require crossing the apron or hangar area. Design Concepts . The pier should extend into the water to a point where the depth at mean low water level is at least 3 feet (1 m). The supporting timbers and decking of fixed structures used for passengers and cargo operations must be designed to support live loads of at least 100 pounds per square foot (488 kilograms per square meter). An access gangway approximately 5 feet (1.5 m) wide with handrails on both sides is recommended. An open deck handling area approximately 30 by 50 feet (9 m by 15 m) at the end of the walkway provides tie-up space for four small or three large seaplanes. Width . Fixed

Safety Management System Prerequisites

  Essential prerequisites for a successful Safety Management System   1 . comprehensive corporate approach                       An effective SMS will provide a means of achieving enhanced safety performance which meets or exceeds basic compliance with the regulatory requirements associated with safety and quality. It is a well established fact that enhanced safety performance is founded upon a proactive safety culture inherent in all the organisation’s safety related activities. It is achieved by effective, devolved executive management in association with a means of independent safety oversight, both of which are the ultimate responsibility of the organisation’s Board and Chief Executive Officer. The Board and CEO are then able to demonstrate how safety is managed in the company. A corporate approach to safety must be able to meet the following criteria: • Published safety accountabilities of managers and key staff • Requirements for a safety manager • The ability to dem